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entered his own inner life'' (p. 253). Loyalty also defines a kingdom of God, as it were, called by Royce the Invisible Church. All the loyal,—whatever their cause,—constitute one genuine religious brotherhood. And thus the loyal co-workers in any field,—in art, science, society,—are, according to Royce, religious devotees and in communion with the Absolute Spirit; for they are loyal to super-individual causes whose meaning and rationality can only be understood in terms of one super-human Life.

Those who are repelled by Idealism on account of its alleged thin abstractions and remoteness from life should read this 'sun-clear' and 'life-intoxicated' book.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. By George Malcolm Stratton. London: George Allen & Co., 1911. Pp. 367. (Published in the Library of Philosophy. Edited by J. H. Muirhead.)

Although Professor Stratton is a professional psychologist, he has found occasion to refer in the text of this book to only one of the psychologists who have made their names known in the field of religion, and that reference is insignificant. The mention of this fact is intended here as an acknowledgment of the originality of Professor Stratton in the treatment of his problem.

His data come first from the great canonical collections, the epics, the reliable accounts of customs and observances, and only in the second place from introspective reports of individuals. For, as the author believes, not the statements of individuals in answer to questions or otherwise, but "the prayer, the hymn, the myth, the sacred prophecies . . . furnish to the psychologist the best means of examining the full nature of religion, in its diverse forms" (Preface). If one's purpose is to give a vivid and definite impression of the conflict of motives and practices in religious life, this method is undoubtedly the better one. But there are problems for the solution of which individual records are the more precious, and even the only sufficient source of information.

Students of religion owe Professor Stratton a debt of gratitude for having opened more systematically and widely than

had been done before, the treasure-house of social religious records. No race, and hardly any people, remains unrepresented: Australians, North and South Americans, Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, Malays, Hindoos, Egyptians, Greeks, Jews, Arabs, Persians, are made to contribute from their sacred writings, or unwritten customs and beliefs, to an admirably comprehensive picture of the varieties of motives, practices, and ideas, which enter into the almost endless forms of religion.

The book is divided into four parts with the following titles: *Conflicts in Regard to Feeling and Emotion; Conflicts in Regard to Action; Conflicts in Regard to Religious Thought; Central Forces in Religion*. This last part is much the shortest; it includes forty-two pages, divided into three chapters: *The Idealizing Act, Change and Permanence in the Ideal, Standards in Religion*.

The manysidedness, the breadth of sympathy, the careful moderation, and the literary taste evinced in this book give it a place apart. Concerning the outcome of the work, it can be said truly that the author has achieved his end, namely, to give "a vivid and definite impression of the war of motives in religion" (Preface). This conflict he has succeeded in making evident, in explaining, and in illustrating by like conflicts that are not religious. We are shown in an impressive array of facts drawn from every quarter of the earth, that there is in religious life both appreciation and contempt of self, breadth and narrowness of sympathy, acceptance and renunciation of the world, gloom and cheer, coolness and fondness for rites, activity and passivity, trust and jealousy of intellect, opposition of picture and thought in the representation of the divine, many gods and one god, divinities at hand and divinities afar off. (I have merely reproduced, more or less textually, headings of chapters.)

These merits acknowledged and appreciated, there remains in my mind a regret that Professor Stratton treated his subject as he did. But he performed a task of his own choosing, and many will doubtless disagree with me and feel that a more profitable point of view than the one from which he proceeded in his investigation of religious life, could hardly have been found. In any case there will be unanimity, I suppose, in the opinion that the book is as much a study of the rich diversity of human nature seen in religious life, as a study of religion itself.

The only criticism I shall offer will bear upon the author's

definition of religion and his defense of the noetic value of religion. The formula in which he expresses the dominant characteristic of religion seems to me deficient in that it places the emphasis upon appreciation, *i. e.*, upon a class of feelings and not upon active desire. The sense of value is no more a specific characteristic of religion than is any other feeling. "Religion," he tells us, "is the appreciation of an unseen world, usually an unseen company; and religion is also whatever seems clearly to be moving toward such an appreciation or to be returning from it. Or perhaps it might better be described as man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the Best or Greatest." A little further on he adds: "Religion is the gradual awakening to the weight and import of a peculiar order of objects. The sense of value, of significance, has found a new medium, a new direction" (pp. 343, 345). The deeper aspect of religion,—because the deeper aspect of life,—is in my opinion a desire for, and an attempt to secure things that are valued. But that which differentiates religious from secular life is the kind of power from which the gratification of desire is expected. To be religious is better defined, in my opinion, as *entering into or standing in dynamic relation* with an unseen hyperhuman company because of one's appreciation of the outcome of this relation.

I find myself in complete agreement with the author's understanding of the relation of feeling to religion as set forth in a passage on pages 341-2, beginning with the sentence, "The truth is missed when some special feeling is believed to be religion's characteristic mark."¹

The chief interest of the last chapter (*Standards of Religion*) lies in its defense of the proposition that "Religion is justified in taking part in the discovery of the truth." This old question is again much in evidence since the advent of the pragmatic philosophy. I shall use Professor Stratton's presentation as an occasion for a brief expression of my own views.

I wish that instead of insisting upon the right of the heart and of the conscience to a share in the establishment of objective truth, he had insisted rather upon the *nature* of that influence

¹ See also pp. 121, 122, 125ff, and compare my similar statements in "Religion as a Factor in the Struggle for Life," *Am. Jr. of Psy. and Educ.*, II, 1906, pp. 314-318. See also the two first chapters of "A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future," Macmillan & Co., 1912.

and indicated the *limitations* of the function of desire and need in the determination of objective truth. What are exactly the respective legitimate functions of heart and intellect? Man has not waited for the permission of the philosopher to accept the guidance of his moral needs in determining reality. Religious souls have usually done more; they have behaved as if the moral needs were not merely one of the guides to knowledge, but its own instrument. It is because of this wantonness of piety that the dominant religious beliefs of the present, instead of harmonizing with and completing those of science, are altogether alien or antagonistic to them. The Ritschlian school of theology, for instance, in order to save 'faith,' claims in behalf of theology a complete divorce of science and metaphysics.

The relation of human needs,—whether the need of causal explanation, of logical consistency, of moral harmony, or of any other kind,—to the discovery of the reality through which they may be gratified is expressible in the following propositions. All human needs have the same function in the discovery of factual truth: they constitute merely demands and incentives. It is the intellect which passes upon the validity of each factual proposition made in the interest of any need. The determination "of the concrete system of facts" qualified to meet the demands of the heart and of conscience belongs thus also to science.

Can those who would reject these propositions say why and wherein the rights of the intellect should be different when the question is one of the satisfaction of the body from when it is one of the satisfaction of the heart? In the first case, there is, for instance, a craving. The object desired may take a definite form, let it be some particular food or medicine. The desired food or drug taken, the body is satisfied. In the second case, the heart yearns for friendship or love; the object of the craving may here also assume a definite form; it may be a man, a woman, or a god. Presently the heart has found its satisfaction. The need as felt, and the gratification as experienced, are incontrovertible, absolute facts. It would be as absurd for science to challenge them as to challenge bare sensation or simple feeling. But it is otherwise when it is affirmed that one particular substance is the cause of the relief to the body or that the objective existence of a particular transhuman Order or Being is the

cause of the moral comfort. Here science is in both cases in its rightful province.

What is the intention of those who in this connection remind us, as does Professor Stratton, that science proceeds upon assumptions that cannot be fully verified, that "scientific labor is always a sifting and a rearranging and supplementing of what the senses offer." What of that? Is it implied that an equal freedom is refused to religion? Would that religion were as careful in establishing its factual truths as is science! The only proper use that may be made of this reminder, is as a warning to religion that although it, as well as science, possesses the right to make hypotheses, it cannot claim for them equal certainty with those of science until, when examined with all possible 'critical cunning,' these religious hypotheses have been found to fit the facts for the explanation of which they were devised as well as the scientific hypotheses agree with the facts to which they refer. Does, for instance, the hypothesis of a righteous and benevolent personal God in direct communication with man and in control of the physical world fit the facts as the known physical phenomena fit the hypotheses of science? The only possible answer to this query is negative.

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THE STABILITY OF TRUTH: A DISCUSSION OF REALITY AS RELATED TO THOUGHT AND ACTION. By David Starr Jordan. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911. Pp. 180.

The gist of this little volume,—the substance of six lectures delivered on the John Calvin McNair Foundation, in the University of North Carolina, in January, 1910,—is expressed in the following passages: "The purpose of this book is to set forth the doctrine that the final test of truth is found in trusting our lives to it. Truth is livable, while error is not, and the difference appears through the strain of the conduct of life. Science is human experience tested and set in order. . . . It is often claimed that the real nature of the thing in itself is so distant from our experiences, so absolutely inscrutable, incomprehensible, and unknowable, that we can have no truth whatever in regard to it. All we have is our expression of certain effects on our consciousness. We assume, without real